What Makes Behavioral Measures of Consciousness Subjective and Direct?

Philosophy of Science 89 (4):683-700 (2022)
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This article addresses two issues: the distinction between objective and subjective measures and the directness of such measures. It is argued that the distinction is unambiguous only when based on a methodological criterion rather than a semantic one. Different senses of directness are discussed: metaphysical, methodological, semantic, and causal.



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On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Can we solve the mind-body problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.
Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.

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