Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):1-17 (2022)
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Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking.

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Renee Jorgensen
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law – Corrigendum.Renée Jorgensen - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):636-636.

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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.

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