“Mind is brain” is trivial and nonscientific in both neurobiology and cognitive science

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):842-842 (1999)
Gold & Stoljar reveal that adherence to the radical neuron doctrine cannot be maintained via appeals to scientific principles. Using arguments from naturalism and materialism, unification, and exemplars, it is shown that the “mind-is-brain” materialism explicit in the trivial version of the neuron doctrine ultimately suffers the same theoretical fate. Cognitive science, if it is to adopt an ontology at all, would be better served by a metaphysically neutral ontology such as double-aspect theory or neutral monism
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X99362191
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