Mind and Language:1-18 (2019)

Authors
Agustin Vicente
University of the Basque Country
Marta Jorba
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Abstract
Phenomenal contrast arguments (PCAs) are normally employed as arguments showing that a certain mental feature contributes to (the phenomenal character of) experience, that certain contents are represented in experience and that kinds of sui generis phenomenologies such as cognitive phenomenology exist. In this paper we examine a neglected aspect of such arguments, i.e., the kind of mental episodes involved in them, and argue that this happens to be a crucial feature of the arguments. We use linguistic tools to determine the lexical aspect of verbs and verb phrases – the tests for a/telicity and for duration. We then suggest that all PCAs can show is the presence of a generic achievement-like phenomenology, especially in the cognitive domain, which contrasts with the role that PCAs are given in the literature.
Keywords phenomenal contrast  cognitive phenomenology
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Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1111/mila.12248
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References found in this work BETA

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susannah Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Significance of Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
Cognitive Phenomenology.Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.

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