Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):35-54 (2008)

Authors
Andrew Jorgensen
Temple University (PhD)
Abstract
Fodor & Lepore and Williamson attack the inferentialist account of concept possession according to which possessing or understanding a concept requires endorsing the inference patterns constitutive of its content. I show that Fodor & Lepore’s concern - that the conception places an exorbitant epistemological demands on possessors of a concept - is met by Brandom’s tolerance of materially bad nonconservative inferences. Such inferences themselves, as Williamson argues, present difficulties for the ‘understanding as endorsement’ conception. I show that, properly understood, Brandom’s broad conception of inferential role, which encompasses social-perspectival inferential connections, has the resources to respond to Willianson’s challenge.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Continental Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 1897-1652
DOI pjphil2008214
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Assessing Concept Possession as an Explicit and Social Practice.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 51 (4):801-816.

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