Philosophy of Science 46 (3):425-438 (1979)
The issue of the conventionality of geometry is considered in the light of the special theory of relativity. The consequences of Minkowski's insights into the ontology of special relativity are elaborated. Several logically distinct senses of "conventionalism" and "realism" are distinguished, and it is argued that the special theory vindicates some of these possible positions but not others. The significance of the usual distinction between relativity and conventionality is discussed. Finally, it is argued that even though the spatial metric within an inertial reference frame is euclidean, it is impossible to define unique objects which can serve as the relativistic surrogates of the spatial points of classical geometry
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Does Special Relativity Theory Tell Us Anything New About Space and Time?László E. Szabó - manuscript
Lorentzian Theories Vs. Einsteinian Special Relativity - a Logico-Empiricist Reconstruction.Laszlo E. Szabo - forthcoming - In A. Maté, M. Rédei & F. Stadler (eds.), Vienna Circle and Hungary -- Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis. Springer.
Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Compatible?Nicholas Maxwell - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):640-645.
On the Arbitrary Choice Regarding Which Inertial Reference Frame is "Stationary" and Which is "Moving" in the Special Theory of Relativity.Douglas M. Snyder - 1994 - Philosophical Explorations.
The “Reality” of the Lorentz Contraction.Dennis Dieks - 1984 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 15 (2):330-342.
The Sui Generis Conventionality of Simultaneity.Laurent A. Beauregard - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (4):469-490.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads115 ( #41,177 of 2,152,520 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #281,162 of 2,152,520 )
How can I increase my downloads?