Intentions and Trolleys

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):63 - 83 (2006)
The series of 'trolley' examples issue a challenge to moral principles based on intentions, since it seems that these give the wrong answers in two important cases: 'Fat Man', where they seem to say that it is permissible to push someone in front of a trolley to save others, and 'Loop', where they seem to say that it is wrong to divert a trolley towards a single person whose body will stop it and save others. I reply, first, that there is a parallel between the wrongful intention to mutilate in 'Transplant', where one person's vital organs are removed to save others' lives, and the intention to assault in Fat Man. Secondly, I defend Frances Kamm's view that in Loop one can divert the trolley towards the one without an intention to kill or assault, since good potential side-effects can be taken into account in deciding what to do, without their becoming intentions
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00429.x
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References found in this work BETA
T. M. Scanlon (2000). Intention and Permissibility, I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):301–317.
Neil Delaney (2001). To Double Business Bound. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75 (4):561-583.

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