Moral Reasoning: Hints and Allegations

Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):511-527 (2010)

Authors
Joshua D. Greene
Harvard University
Abstract
Recent research in moral psychology highlights the role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment. In the wake of these findings, the role and significance of moral reasoning remain uncertain. In this article, we distinguish among different kinds of moral reasoning and review evidence suggesting that at least some kinds of moral reasoning play significant roles in moral judgment, including roles in abandoning moral intuitions in the absence of justifying reasons, applying both deontological and utilitarian moral principles, and counteracting automatic tendencies toward bias that would otherwise dominate behavior. We argue that little is known about the psychology of moral reasoning and that it may yet prove to be a potent social force
Keywords Moral reasoning  Social intuitionist model  Dual‐process model  Moral judgment
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DOI 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01096.x
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References found in this work BETA

An Integrative Theory of Prefrontal Cortex Function.Earl K. Miller & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2001 - Annual Review of Neuroscience 24 (1):167-202.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment.Joshua D. Greene - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (1):163-177.

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