Disputatio 7 (41):193-206 (2015)

Authors
Joseph Long
State University of New York, Brockport
Abstract
I have recently argued that if the causal theory of reference is true, then, on pain of absurdity, no normative ethical theory is true. In this journal, Michael Byron has objected to my reductio by appealing to Frank Jackson’s moral reductionism. The present essay defends reductio while also casting doubt upon Jackson’s moral reductionism.
Keywords Causal theory of reference  Right-making properties  Moral reductionism  Frank Jackson  Justifying reasons
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DOI 10.2478/disp-2015-0010
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.

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