Synthese:1-19 (forthcoming)

Abstract
Richard Bradley’s landmark book Decision Theory with a Human Face makes seminal contributions to nearly every major area of decision theory, as well as most areas of formal epistemology and many areas of semantics. In addition to sketching Bradley’s distinctive semantics for conditional beliefs and desires, I will explain his theory of conditional desire, focusing particularly on his claim that we should not desire events, either positively or negatively, under the supposition that they will occur. I shall argue, to the contrary, that permitting non-trivial desirabilities for events whose occurrence is known or assumed is both more intuitively plausible and more theoretically fruitful than Bradley’s approach. In the course of the discussion I will contrast Bradley’s broadly evidentialist picture of decision theory with my own more orthodox causal approach.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-02579-2
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Similar books and articles

Conditional Desirability.Richard Bradley - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (1):23-55.
Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
Conditionals and the Logic of Decision.Richard Bradley - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):32.
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Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utility.Brad Armendt - 1988 - In William Harper & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 3-24.

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