The value of truth: a reply to Howson

Analysis 75 (3):413-424 (2015)
Authors
James M. Joyce
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Colin Howson has recently argued that accuracy arguments for probabilism fail because they assume a privileged ‘coding’ in which TRUE is assigned the value 1 and FALSE is assigned the value 0. I explain why this is wrong by first showing that Howson’s objections are based on a misconception about the way in which degrees of confidence are measured, and then reformulating the accuracy argument in a way that manifestly does not depend on the coding of truth-values. Along the way, I will explain how to formulate the laws of probability and rational expectation in a scale-invariant way, and how to properly understand the values of the credence functions that we use to represent rational degrees of confidence
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anv035
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A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.
Theory of Probability.Bruno de Finetti - 1970 - New York: John Wiley.
What Probability Probably Isn't.C. Howson - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):53-59.

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