Don't Take Unnecessary Chances!

Synthese 132 (1/2):9 - 26 (2002)
Abstract
The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the "single case" application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. "Propensities" are needed only in theoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,334
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Don't Take Unnecessary Chances!Henry E. Kyburg - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1-2):9-26.
Some Considerations on Conditional Chances.Paul Humphreys - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):667-680.
Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under the Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities?Marc Lange - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):383-403.
Probabilities, Propensities, and Chances.Colin Howson - 1984 - Erkenntnis 21 (3):279 - 293.
What Chances Could Not Be.Jenann Ismael - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):79-91.
Deterministic Chance.Luke Glynn - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):51–80.
David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance.Barry Loewer - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25.
Fitness and Propensity's Annulment?Marshall Abrams - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (1):115-130.
Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total downloads
12 ( #421,768 of 2,224,474 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #423,227 of 2,224,474 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature