The Logic of Causal Methods in Social Science

Synthese 57 (1):67 - 82 (1983)

Abstract
Two kinds of causal inference rules which are widely used by social scientists are investigated. Two conceptions of causation also widely used are explicated -- the INUS and probabilistic conceptions of causation. It is shown that the causal inference rules which link correlation, a kind of partial correlation, and a conception of causation are invalid. It is concluded a new methodology is required for causal inference.
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