Tarski, truth, and semantics

Philosophical Review 106 (4):533-554 (1997)
Abstract
John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics.
Keywords Tarski  Truth
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DOI phr1997106473
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Theories and Theories of Truth.Ryan Christensen - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (1):31-43.
Tarski's Definition and Truth-Makers.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):57-76.
Truth-Definitions and Definitional Truth.Douglas Patterson - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):313-328.

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