Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59-76 (2005)

Juan Comesaña
University of Arizona
In this paper I argue against Mentalism, the claim that all the factors that contribute to the epistemic justification of a doxastic attitude towards a proposition by a subject S are mental states of S. My objection to mentalism is that there is a special kind of fact (what I call a "support fact") that contributes to the justification of any belief, and that is not mental. My argument against mentalism, then, is the following: Anti-mentalism argument: 1. If mentalism is true, then support facts are mental. 2. Support facts are not mental. Therefore, 3. Mentalism is not true. In what follows I explain what support facts are, and then defend each of the premises of my argument. I conclude with some remarks regarding the relevance of my argument for the larger internalism/externalism debate(s) in epistemology.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00053.x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,901
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.
Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 63--82.
Might All Normativity Be Queer?Matthew S. Bedke - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):41-58.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Self-Knowledge That Externalists Leave Out.Lisa L. Hall - 1998 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):115-123.
Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation.James Dreier - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
Internalism for Externalists.Peter Railton - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):166-181.
The Skeptic, the Content Externalist, and the Theist.Robert Howell - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):173-180.
The Semantic Basis of Externalism.Michael McKinsey - 2001 - In J. Campbell, M. O. Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth. New York: Seven Bridges Press.


Added to PP index

Total views
157 ( #65,164 of 2,439,024 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #434,440 of 2,439,024 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes