Ontology and mathematical truth

Noûs 11 (2):133-150 (1977)
The main goal of this paper is to urge that the normal platonistic account of mathematical truth is unsatisfactory even if pure abstract entities are assumed to exist (in a non-Question-Begging way). It is argued that the task of delineating an interpretation of a formal mathematical theory among pure abstract entities is not one that can be accomplished. An important effect of this conclusion on the question of the ontological commitments of informal mathematical theories is discussed. The paper concludes with a sketch of a non-Platonistic theory of mathematical truth which utilizes an unanalyzed notion of logical possibility
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2214541
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,392
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
A. P. Hazen (1993). Against Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):132 – 144.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

167 ( #25,116 of 1,924,703 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #96,481 of 1,924,703 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.