Cambridge University Press (1993)
Abstract |
This is a book about the concept of a physical thing and about how the names of things relate to the things they name. It questions the prevalent view that names 'refer to' or 'denote' the things they name. Instead it presents a new theory of proper names, according to which names express certain special properties that the things they name exhibit. This theory leads to some important conclusions about whether things have any of their properties as a matter of necessity. This will be an important book for philosophers in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, though it will also interest linguists concerned with the semantics of natural language.
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Keywords | Reference (Philosophy Names Identity (Philosophical concept Essentialism (Philosophy Necessity (Philosophy Ontology Modality (Logic |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2009 |
Buy this book | $26.39 used (22% off) $29.84 new (12% off) $33.99 from Amazon Amazon page |
Call number | B105.R25.J83 1993 |
ISBN(s) | 0521433991 0521108578 9780521433990 9780521108577 |
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Entities and Their Genera: Slicing Up the World the Medieval Way--And Does It Matter to Formal Ontology?Luis M. Augusto - 2022 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 3 (2):4-47.
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