Why 'non-mental' won't work: On Hempel's dilemma and the characterization of the 'physical' [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 140 (3):299 - 318 (2008)
Authors
Neal Judisch
University of Oklahoma
Abstract
 Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis
Keywords Physicalism  Characterization of physical  Non-mental  Causal argument for physicalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9142-8
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References found in this work BETA

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

Redefining Physicalism.Guy Dove - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):513-522.
Physicalism as an Empirical Hypothesis.David Spurrett - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3347-3360.
Physicalism as a Research Programme.Duško Prelević - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):15-33.

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