Bayesianism and reliable scientific inquiry

Philosophy of Science 60 (2):302-319 (1993)
Abstract
The inductive reliability of Bayesian methods is explored. The first result presented shows that for any solvable inductive problem of a general type, there exists a subjective prior which yields a Bayesian inductive method that solves the problem, although not all subjective priors give rise to a successful inductive method for the problem. The second result shows that the same does not hold for computationally bounded agents, so that Bayesianism is "inductively incomplete" for such agents. Finally a consistency proof shows that inductive agents do not need to disregard inductive failure on sets of subjective probability 0 in order to be ideally rational. Together the results reveal the inadequacy of the subjective Bayesian norms for scientific methodology
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DOI 10.1086/289734
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Curve-Fitting for Bayesians?Gordon Belot - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv061.

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