Steadfastness, deference, and permissive rationality

Synthese 194 (12):5093-5112 (2017)
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Abstract
Recently, Levinstein has offered two interesting arguments concerning epistemic norms and epistemic peer disagreement. In his first argument, Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and steadfast attitudes in the face of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second argument, he argues that, given an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. However, in this paper, I show that when we clearly distinguish among several types of Permissivism, Permissivism\, and Permissivism\), we can see that any type of Permissivism fits well with steadfast attitudes. Further, even though Levinstein’s ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle’ does rule out a possibility for some types of Permissivism and Permissivism\), it is still compatible with the other type of Permissivism ), so we may regard at least that version of a deference principle as a viable position in connection with that particular type of permissive rationality.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1197-7
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