Is Psychopathy a Harmful Dysfunction?
Biology and Philosophy 34 (5):1-23 (2019)
Abstract
In their paper “Is psychopathy a mental disease?”, Thomas Nadelhoffer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argue that according to any plausible account of mental disorder, neural and psychological abnormalities correlated with psychopathy should be regarded as signs of a mental disorder. I oppose this conclusion by arguing that at least on a naturalistically grounded account, such as Wakefield’s ‘Harmful Dysfunction’ view, currently available empirical data and evolutionary considerations indicate that psychopathy is not a mental disorder.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s10539-018-9668-5
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The insanity defence without mental illness? Some considerations.Luca Malatesti, Marko Jurjako & Gerben Meynen - 2020 - International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 71.
In what sense are mental disorders brain disorders? Explicating the concept of mental disorder within RDoC.Marko Juriako & Luca Malatesti - 2020 - Phenomenology and Mind 18:182-198.
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The value-ladenness of psychopathy.Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2022 - In Luca Malatesti, John McMillan & Predrag Šustar (eds.), Psychopathy: Its Uses, Validity and Status. Cham: Springer. pp. 215-233.
References found in this work
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