New York: Oxford University Press (2013)

Authors
Neal Tognazzini
Western Washington University
D. Justin Coates
University of Houston
Abstract
One mark of interpersonal relationships is a tendency to blame. But what precise evaluations and responses constitute blame? Is it most centrally a judgment, or is it an emotion, or something else? Does blame express a demand, or embody a protest, or does it simply mark an impaired relationship? What accounts for its force or sting, and how similar is it to punishment?The essays in this volume explore answers to these questions about the nature of blame, but they also explore the various norms that govern the propriety of blame. The traditional question is whether anyone ever deserves to be blamed, but the essays here provide a fresh perspective by focusing on blame from the blamer's perspective instead. Is our tendency to blame a vice, something we should work to replace with more humane ways of relating, or does it rather lie at the very heart of a commitment to morality? What can we legitimately expect of each other, and in general, what sort of attitude do would-be blamers need to have in order to have the standing to blame? Hypocritical or self-righteous blame seems objectionable, but why?The contributions to this volume aim to give us a fuller picture of the nature and norms of blame, and more generally of the promises and perils of membership in the human moral community.
Keywords blame  moral responsibility  blameworthiness
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ISBN(s) 9780199860821   9780199860845   0199860823   019986084X
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Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139.
Moral Responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Culpability, Blame, and the Moral Dynamics of Social Power.Catriona Mackenzie - 2021 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 95 (1):163-182.

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