Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):841-855 (2017)

Authors
Justin Clarke-Doane
Columbia University
Abstract
Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons (BRR) is a beautiful book – sleek, sophisticated, and programmatic. One of its key aims is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths. In this article, I develop an epistemological problem that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that his “metaphysical pluralism” can be understood as a response to that problem. However, it resolves the problem only if it undercuts the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry.
Keywords scanlon  objectivity  set theory  normative  reliability  pluralism  debunking  safety  ethics and mathematics  benacerraf
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2017.1315289
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
A New Route From Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.
Evolution and Moral Disagreement.Michael Klenk - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).

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