Ratio 16 (1):33–48 (2003)
AbstractFrege's thesis that each singular term has a sense that determines its reference and serves as its cognitive value has come to be widely doubted. Saul Kripke argued that since names are rigid designators, their referents are not determined by senses. David Kaplan has argued that the rigid designation of indexical terms entails that they also lack referent–determining senses. Kripke's argument about names and Kaplan's argument about indexical terms differ, but each contains a false premise. The referents of both names and indexical terms are determined by reflexive senses. It is reflexive sense that makes these terms rigid designators.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege - 1952 - Oxford, England: Blackwell.
The Causal Theory of Names.Gareth Evans - 1973 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 47 (1):187–208.
Citations of this work
The Metasyntactic Interpretation of Two-Dimensionalism.Gregory Bochner - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):611-626.
Similar books and articles
Proper Names as Rigid Presuppositions.Emar Maier - 2007 - In Estella Puig-Waldmüller (ed.), Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung 11. pp. 418-32.
Rigid Designation, Direct Reference, and Modal Metaphysics.Arthur Sullivan - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):577–599.
What is the Point? Concepts, Description, and Rigid Designation.Bradley Franks & Nick Braisby - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-70.