The knowledge argument--some comments

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):193-197 (2004)
Abstract
The paper discusses Crane’s analysis of Knowledge argument, and sets forth author’s disagreement with Crane. Surely Mary learns something new when she sees a color for the first time. The time for a physicalist to quarrel comes only when a qualia person says that this experience represents special phenomenal facts, and that such understanding should be identified with propositional knowledge. We should not confuse ‘having information’ with having the same information in the form of knowledge or belief. Mary knows everything there is to know about color vision. The only thing she has not done is practically experience what it is like to see a color. Thus her knowledge gap is practical and not propositional
Keywords Epistemology  Knowledge  Mind  Physicalism  Crane, T
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DOI croatjphil20044212
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