Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100 (2003)

Authors
Jason Megill
Bentley College
Abstract
This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A. I., and the research program of affective computing.
Keywords *Cognition  *Cognitive Processes  *Consciousness States  *Emotional States  *Selective Attention  Artificial Intelligence  Brain Disorders  Cognitive Psychology  Face Perception  Theories
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Emotion, Cognition and Artificial Intelligence.Jason Megill - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (2):189-199.

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