Minds and Machines 21 (1):41-56 (2011)
It has been argued that prototypes cannot compose, and that for this reason concepts cannot be prototypes (Osherson and Smith in Cognition 9:35–58, 1981; Fodor and Lepore in Cognition 58:253–270, 1996; Connolly et al. in Cognition 103:1–22, 2007). In this paper I examine the intensional and extensional approaches to prototype compositionality, arguing that neither succeeds in their present formulations. I then propose a hybrid extensional theory of prototype compositionality, according to which the extension of a complex concept is determined as a function of what triggers its constituent prototypes. I argue that the theory escapes the problems traditionally raised against extensional theories of compositionality
|Keywords||Prototypes Compositionality Extensional compositionality Intensional compositionality|
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References found in this work BETA
Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - MIT Press.
On the Adequacy of Prototype Theory as a Theory of Concepts.Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith - 1981 - Cognition 9 (1):35-58.
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