Interdisciplinary Ontology 5:67-73 (2012)
AbstractM. Johnston proposed an adverbialist solution to the problem of intrinsic change for enduring things. D. Lewis interpreted it as a way of tensing the copula. In his view, it has the defect of replacing the having simpliciter of a property by the standing in a triadic relation to a property and a time, and so is threatened by Bradley’s Regress. I agree with Lewis on requiring the having a property to be non-relational, while I disagree with him on restricting it to the having simpliciter. I tense the copula non-relationally and yet more seriously than Johnston, by characterizing tense as a copulative de re modality concerning endurance, which I relate to R. Taylor’s ‘pure becoming’. I will show that my way gives a better solution to the problem of intrinsic change than those by other endurantists, because of its close connection int to an account of tense, endurance and becoming.
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Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time.E. J. Lowe - 1998 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time.Edward Jonathan Lowe - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth.Colin McGinn - 2000 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.