The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297 (1998)

Shelly Kagan
Yale University
According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsic value may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, then the traditional contrast between intrinsic value and instrumental value is mistaken.
Keywords instrumental value  intrinsic properties  intrinsic value
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DOI 10.1023/a:1009782403793
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Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.
Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
Objective and Unconditioned Value.Rae Langton - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):157-185.

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