On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology

Mind and Language 27 (5):519-545 (2012)
According to Joshua Greene’s influential dual process model of moral judgment, different modes of processing are associated with distinct moral outputs: automatic processing with deontological judgment, and controlled processing with utilitarian judgment. This paper aims to clarify and assess Greene’s model. I argue that the proposed tie between process and content is based on a misinterpretation of the evidence, and that the supposed evidence for controlled processing in utilitarian judgment is actually likely to reflect generic deliberation which, ironically, is incompatible with a utilitarian outlook. This alternative proposal is further supported by the results of a recent neuroimaging study we have done.
Keywords Moral judgment  Utilitarian judgment  Dual process models  Cognitive science  Neuroscience
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12001
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References found in this work BETA
Selim Berker (2009). The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.

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