Pain, dislike and experience

Utilitas 21 (3):327-336 (2009)
Abstract
It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, and that when pain is not disliked, it is not intrinsically bad. This conjunction of claims has often been taken to support a subjectivist view of pain’s badness on which pain is bad simply because it is the object of a negative attitude and not because of what it feels like. In this paper, I argue that accepting this conjunction of claims does not commit us to this subjectivist view. They are compatible with an objectivist view of pain’s badness, and with thinking that this badness is due to its phenomenal quality. Indeed, I argue that once the full range of options is in view, the most plausible account of pain is incompatible with subjectivism about value.
Keywords Pain  Experience  Badness  Subjectivism  Objectivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0953820809990070
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument.Guy Kahane - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Pain Perception, Affective Mechanisms, and Conscious Experience.C. Richard Chapman - 2004 - In Thomas Hadjistavropoulos & Kenneth D. Craig (eds.), Pain: Psychological Perspectives. pp. 59-85.
The Pain Problem.Terry Dartnall - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):95-102.
Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience.Adam J. Kolber - 2007 - American Journal of Law & Medicine 33 (2&3):433-456.
Objective and Subjective Aspects of Pain.Nikola Grahek - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):249-66.
Do Animals Feel Pain?Peter Singer - 1990 - In Peter. Singer (ed.), Animal Liberation. Avon Books.
Intentionalism and Pain.David Bain - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.
Pain and Masochism.Irwin Goldstein - 1983 - Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (3):219-223.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-06-06

Total downloads

496 ( #3,634 of 2,177,988 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

44 ( #5,347 of 2,177,988 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums