Rule consequentialism and disasters

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):219-236 (2013)
Abstract
Rule consequentialism (RC) is the view that it is right for A to do F in C if and only if A's doing F in C is in accordance with the the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules (i.e., the ideal code). I defend RC from two related objections. The first objection claims that RC requires obedience to the ideal code even if doing so has disastrous results. Though some rule consequentialists embrace a disaster-clause which permits agents to disregard some of the rules in the ideal code as a necessary means of avoiding disasters, they have not adequately explained how this clause works. I offer such an explanation and show how it fits naturally with the rest of RC. The second disaster objection asserts that even if RC can legitimately invoke a disaster-clause, it lacks principled grounds from distinguishing disasters from non-disasters. In response, I explore Hooker's suggestion that “disaster” is vague. I contend that every plausible ethical theory must invoke something similar to a disaster clause. So if “disaster” is vague, then every plausible ethical theory faces a difficulty with it. As a result, this vagueness is not a reason to prefer other theories to RC. However, I argue, contra Hooker, that the sense of “disaster” relevant to RC is not vague, and RC does indeed have principled grounds to distinguish disasters from nondisasters.
Keywords Act consequentialism  Rule consequentialism  Agent-centered constraints  Disasters  Ideal code  Vagueness
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9756-8
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On What Matters.Parfit Derek - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.

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