In Mill on Justice. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 198 (2012)
I begin this chapter by outlining Mill's thinking about why justice is a problem for utilitarians. Next, I turn to Mill's own account of justice and explain its connection with rights, perfect duties, and harms. I then examine David Lyons' answer to the question of how Mill's account is meant to answer the Weak Objection from Justice. Lyons maintains that Mill's account of justice has both a conceptual side and a substantive side. The former provides an analysis of such concepts as 'justice' and 'rights'. The latter, based on the Principle of Utility, provides an explanation of when these concepts apply. As a result, utilitarians can allow for circumstances in which actions are wrong because they are unjust, while also claiming that the standards of right and wrong (as well as justice and injustice) are determined by the Principle of Utility. However, the main thesis of this paper is that Lyons' interpretation is flawed. The distinction between the conceptual and the substantive levels of Mill's thinking does not hold up to scrutiny, and even if it did, it would not support Lyon's reading of Mill. It would instead support a debunking interpretation of justice, an interpretation recently explored by Roger Crisp. Such a debunking interpretation suggests a very different response to the Weak Objection from Justice, one that many, but not all, utilitarians will find unwelcome.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Completing the Incomplete: A Defense of Positive Obligations to Distant Others.Joshua Kassner - 2009 - Journal of Global Ethics 5 (3):181 – 193.
Just Procedures with Controversial Outcomes: On the Grounds for Substantive Disputation Within a Procedural Theory of Justice.Emanuela Ceva - 2009 - Res Publica 15 (3):219-235.
Social Justice in the Modern Regulatory State: Duress, Necessity and the Consensual Model in Law.Lucinda Vandervort - 1987 - Law and Philosophy 6 (2):205 - 225.
Added to index2010-10-01
Total downloads43 ( #118,017 of 2,154,175 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #397,226 of 2,154,175 )
How can I increase my downloads?