Conceivability and modality in Hume: A lemma in an argument in defense of skeptical realism

Hume Studies 29 (1):43--61 (2003)
This paper examines the ramifications of Hume's view of the relation of conceivability to metaphysical possibility. It argues that the limitations Hume places of the representations involved in moves to conceivability to metaphysical possibility preclude any straightforward argument against full-blooded causal realism in Hume from conceivability. Furthermore, our finding certain states of affairs conceivable when they are not metaphysically possible is perfectly compatible with the thrust of the causal realist position.
Keywords Conceivability, Epistemology, Modality, Realism, Scepticism  Hume
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DOI 10.1353/hms.2011.0136
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