Contextualism between scepticism and common-sense

Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):247-266 (2005)
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Abstract

This paper examines two recent objections against contextualism. The first is that contextualists are unable to assert their own position, and the second is that contextualists are forced to side with common-sense against scepticism. It is argued that once we get clear on the commitments of contextualism, neither objection succeeds in what it aims to show.

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2009-01-28

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Jesper Kallestrup
University of Aberdeen

Citations of this work

Contextualism and the Factivity Problem.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580-602.

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