Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):247-266 (2005)

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Abstract
This paper examines two recent objections against contextualism. The first is that contextualists are unable to assert their own position, and the second is that contextualists are forced to side with common-sense against scepticism. It is argued that once we get clear on the commitments of contextualism, neither objection succeeds in what it aims to show.
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-069001013
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