From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility

Res Philosophica 93 (3):533-552 (2016)
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Epistemic anti-individualism is the view that positive epistemic statuses fail to supervene on internal, physical or mental, properties of individuals. Intellectual humility is a central intellectual virtue in the pursuit of such statuses. After some introductory remarks, this paper provides an argument for epistemic anti-individualism with respect to a virtue-theoretic account of testimonial knowledge. An outline of a dual-aspect account of intellectual humility is then offered. The paper proceeds to argue that insofar as testimonial knowledge is concerned, this stripe of epistemic anti-individualism leads to a particular account of intellectual humility.



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Author Profiles

Jesper Kallestrup
University of Aberdeen
Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine