Physicalism, conceivability and strong necessities

Synthese 151 (2):273-295 (2006)
Authors
Jesper Kallestrup
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
David Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism relies on the entailment from a priori conceivability to metaphysical possibility. The a posteriori physicalist rejects this premise, but is consequently committed to psychophysical strong necessities. These don't fit into the Kripkean model of the necessary a posteriori, and they are therefore, according to Chalmers, problematic. But given semantic assumptions that are essential to the conceivability argument, there is reason to believe in microphysical strong necessities. This means that some of Chalmers' criticism is unwarranted, and the rest equally afflicts the dualist. Moreover, given that these assumptions are independently plausible, there's a general case to be made for the existence of strong necessities outside the psychophysical domain
Keywords Conceivability  Dualism  Metaphysics  Necessity  Physicalism  Semantics  Chalmers, David J
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-004-7325-9
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References found in this work BETA

Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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Citations of this work BETA

Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience.Tom Polger - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):72-92.
How to Be a Type-C Physicalist.Adrian Boutel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.

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