Synthese 151 (2):273-295 (2006)
AbstractDavid Chalmers' conceivability argument against physicalism relies on the entailment from a priori conceivability to metaphysical possibility. The a posteriori physicalist rejects this premise, but is consequently committed to psychophysical strong necessities. These don't fit into the Kripkean model of the necessary a posteriori, and they are therefore, according to Chalmers, problematic. But given semantic assumptions that are essential to the conceivability argument, there is reason to believe in microphysical strong necessities. This means that some of Chalmers' criticism is unwarranted, and the rest equally afflicts the dualist. Moreover, given that these assumptions are independently plausible, there's a general case to be made for the existence of strong necessities outside the psychophysical domain
Similar books and articles
Conceivability, possibility, and a posteriori necessity: On Chalmers' argument for dualism.Karol Polcyn - 2006 - Diametros 7:37-55.
Physicalism unfalsified: Chalmers' inconclusive argument for dualism.Andrew Melnyk - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 331-349.
Conceiving what is not there.Andrew Botterell - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):21-42.
Zombies, the Uniformity of Nature, and Contingent Physicalism: A Sympathetic Response to Boran Berčić.Luca Malatesti - 2013 - Prolegomena 12 (2):245-259.
Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.
Contemporary Conceivability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind: A Critique.Don A. Merrell - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Arkansas
Chalmers' conceivability argument for dualism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):187-193.
David Chalmers’ Argument for the Logical Possibility of Zombies.Jacek Jarocki - 2013 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 61 (1):23-42.
Argument z wyobrażalności a strategia pojęć fenomenalnych.Karol Polcyn - 2005 - Filozofia Nauki 3.
Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap?E. Diaz-Leon - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):933-951.
The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:393-413.
Conceiving Mind: A Critique of Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Immaterialist Views of Consciousness.Kristin P. Schaupp - 2004 - Dissertation, Marquette University
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Theory Selection in Modal Epistemology.Robert William Fischer - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):381-395.
a Priori Truth of Modal Rationalism.Harry Cleeveley - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):816-836.
References found in this work
Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.