Philosophy 83 (4):497-517 (2008)
This paper sets out a number of reasons for thinking that the framework of possible worlds, even when construed non-reductively, does not provide an adequate basis for an explanation of modality. I first consider a non-reductive version of Lewis' modal realism, and then move on to consider the ersatzist approach of Plantinga et al. My main complaint is that the framework of possible worlds gets the semantics and metaphysics of ordinary modal discourse wrong. That is, possible worlds do not give us an adequate answer to the semantic question of what ordinary modal claims mean, nor do they give us an adequate answer to the metaphysical question of what makes such claims true
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Topological Trees: G H von Wright's Theory of Possible Worlds.David H. Sanford - 1998 - In TImothy Childers (ed.), The Logica Yearbook. Acadamy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.
Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality.John Divers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):660–685.
The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic.Charles S. Chihara - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Impossible Worlds and Propositions: Against the Parity Thesis.Francesco Berto - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):471-486.
A Powers Theory of Modality: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Reject Possible Worlds.Jonathan D. Jacobs - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):227-248.
Why Lewis's Analysis of Modality Succeeds in its Reductive Ambitions.Ross P. Cameron - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12 (8).
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads224 ( #16,574 of 2,164,545 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #50,909 of 2,164,545 )
How can I increase my downloads?