Philosophy 83 (4):497-517 (2008)

Abstract
This paper sets out a number of reasons for thinking that the framework of possible worlds, even when construed non-reductively, does not provide an adequate basis for an explanation of modality. I first consider a non-reductive version of Lewis' modal realism, and then move on to consider the ersatzist approach of Plantinga et al. My main complaint is that the framework of possible worlds gets the semantics and metaphysics of ordinary modal discourse wrong. That is, possible worlds do not give us an adequate answer to the semantic question of what ordinary modal claims mean, nor do they give us an adequate answer to the metaphysical question of what makes such claims true
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819108000855
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References found in this work BETA

Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic.Saul A. Kripke - 1963 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 16:83-94.
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
Counterpart-Theoretic Semantics for Modal Logic.Allen Hazen - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (6):319-338.
Introduction.Kit Fine - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):3-3.

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