Philosophical Studies 105 (2):129-160 (2001)

Authors
Mark Eli Kalderon
University College London
Abstract
I argue that logical understanding is not propositional knowledgebut is rather a species of practical knowledge. I further arguethat given the best explanation of logical understanding someversion or another of inferential role semantics must be the correct account of the determinants of logical content
Keywords Logic  Practical Knowledge  Reasoning  Representation  Understanding
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1010341316352
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert H. Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Meaning as an Inferential Role.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (1):1-35.
Meaning and Inference.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2003 - In Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.), Logica Yearbook 2002. Filosofia.
Inference and Rational Commitment.James Trafford - 2013 - Prolegomena 12 (1):5-20.

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