Reliabilist justification: Basic, easy, and brute [Book Review]

Acta Analytica 24 (3):155-171 (2009)
Authors
Jesper Kallestrup
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
Process reliabilists hold that in order for a belief to be justified, it must result from a reliable cognitive process. They also hold that a belief can be basically justified: justified in this manner without having any justification to believe that belief is reliably produced. Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000), and Cohen (2002) have objected that such basic justification leads to implausible easy justification by means of either epistemic closure principles or so-called track record arguments. I argue that once we carefully distinguish closure principles from transmission principles, and epistemic consequences from epistemic preconditions, neither version of this objection succeeds.
Keywords Reliabilism  Easy justification  Closure principles  Fumerton  Vogel  Cohen
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-009-0053-5
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Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.
How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):137-49.
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.

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