Three strands in Kripke's argument against the identity theory

Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280 (2008)
Abstract
Kripke's argument against the identity theory in the philosophy of mind runs as follows. Suppose some psychophysical identity statement S is true. Then S would seem to be contingent at least in the sense that S seems possibly false. And given that seeming contingency entails genuine contingency when it comes to such statements S is contingent. But S is necessary if true. So S is false. This entry considers responses to each of the three premises. It turns out that each response does not fully withstand scrutiny, and so Kripke's conclusion is hard to resist. Section 1 lays out Kripke's argument, and Sections 2 to 4 then discuss responses to each of the three premises respectively.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00182.x
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References found in this work BETA
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1738 - Oxford University Press.

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Identity Theories.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.

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