Synthese 89 (2):273 - 281 (1991)
Theoretical determinism, as it is usually ascribed to Laplace, is neither verifiable nor falsifiable and has therefore no real content. It is not the same as predictability of actually observable phenomena. On the other hand, predictability is not an abstract principle; rather it is true to a certain degree, depending on the phenomena considered. It can be discussed only by examining the scientific state of affairs. This is done in some detail for classical statistical mechanics. Much of a recently published debate on determinism (Amsterdamski et al. 1990) is thereby obviated.
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References found in this work BETA
Essai philosophique sur les probabilités.Pierre-Simon Laplace & Maurice Solovine - 1923 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 30 (1):1-2.
La Théorie Physique : Son Objet Et Sa Structure.Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem - 1906 - Chevalier & Rivière.
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