Intentionality and information from an ontological point of view

Philosophia 18 (April):107-118 (1988)
Intentionality of cognitive states is not reducible to information if the latter is construed in terms of analytical and nomic constraints. Intentionality and the individuation of cognitive states presupposes cultural constraints that let socially constructed information flow. Fred dretske's information-Theoretical account of intentionality is criticised for ignoring the cultural constraints of human cognition
Keywords Content  Information  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Object  Philosophical Psychology
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DOI 10.1007/BF02380128
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Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.

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