Ronald Dworkin on abortion and assisted suicide

Journal of Ethics 5 (3):221-240 (2001)
In the first part of this article, I raisequestions about Dworkin''s theory of theintrinsic value of life and about the adequacyof his proposal to understand abortion in termsof different ways of valuing life. In thesecond part of the article, I consider hisargument in ``The Philosophers'' Brief on AssistedSuicide'''', which claims that the distinctionbetween killing and letting die is morallyirrelevant, the distinction between intendingand foreseeing death can be morally relevantbut is not always so. I argue that thekilling/letting die distinction can be relevantin the context of assisted suicide, but alsoshow when it is not. Then I consider why theintention/foresight distinction can be morallyirrelevant and conclude by presenting analternative argument for physician-assistedsuicide.
Keywords abortion  Doctrine of Double Effect  intending and foreseeing death  intrinsic value  inviolability  killing and letting die  The Philosophers' Brief on Assisted Suicide  physician-assisted suicide  value of life
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1012755208057
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,495
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
105 ( #50,791 of 2,210,574 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #207,666 of 2,210,574 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature