The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach

Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135 (2019)
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Abstract

I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence.

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Author's Profile

François Kammerer
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Citations of this work

How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):201-226.
How You Know You’re Conscious: Illusionism and Knowledge of Things.Matt Duncan - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):185-205.
Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion.Daniel Shabasson - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):427-453.

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