A Modest Minimalism?

Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):169-178 (2008)
My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Künne in his Conceptions of Truth (2003). I introduce the deflationary theories of truth in the first part of my paper and present briefly the views of a more familiar deflationist, Paul Horwich, as a "stepping-stone" to Künne's account. In the second part of the paper I give an overview of Künne's theory and in the final part I present a dilemma that his account faces: either it is not modest after all or it is incomprehensible.
Keywords Wolfgang Künne  modest account  deflationsm  truth
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DOI 10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.02
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