Yusuke Kaneko
Meiji University
This paper takes two tasks. The one is elaborating on the relationship of inductive logic with decision theory to which later Carnap planned to apply his system (§§1-7); this is a surveying side of this article. The other is revealing the property of our prediction of the future, subjectivity (§§8-11); this is its philosophical aspect. They are both discussed under the name of belief in causation. Belief in causation is a kind of “degree of belief” born about the causal effect of the action. As such, it admits of the analysis by inductive logic.
Keywords Carnap’s inductive logic  decision theory  belief in causation  subjectivity
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