In this paper I examine following Jerry Fodor a distinction between Standard Realism about psychological States and intentional or content realism. I try to assess whether Standard Realism and Intentional Realism can satisfy the following two conditions: condition a The content of psychological states can satisfy a type-token distinction. condition b. The content of psychological states is causally relevant to action.
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