On the distinction between content realism and realism about intentional states

Abstract

In this paper I examine following Jerry Fodor a distinction between Standard Realism about psychological States and intentional or content realism. I try to assess whether Standard Realism and Intentional Realism can satisfy the following two conditions: condition a The content of psychological states can satisfy a type-token distinction. condition b. The content of psychological states is causally relevant to action.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Fodor's modal argument.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
Two routes to narrow content: Both dead ends.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.
The psycho-physical laws of intentionality.J. T. Whyte - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (3):295 – 304.
Shallow versus deep response-dependence.Andrew William Howat - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):155-172.
Fodor’s Vindication of Folk Psychology and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism.Nicholas P. Power - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.
Direct realism, indirect realism, and epistemology.Harold I. Brown - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):341-363.
Content, illusion, partition.York H. Gunther - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (2):185-202.
Affect without object: moods and objectless emotions.Carolyn Price - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):49-68.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
31 (#445,254)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Αspasia Kanellou
University of Athens

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references