In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.),
A Companion to Wittgenstein. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 443–464 (
2017)
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Abstract
This chapter discusses Wittgenstein's private language arguments in both the broad and the narrow sense. It begins by introducing the traditional ideas Wittgenstein's arguments can be seen as undermining. In fact, Wittgenstein points out, it is not bodies that have pains, rather living beings. Only 'of a living human being and what resembles a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious'. Many philosophers have shared the picture or aspects of the picture underlying these views, and have sublimated them into philosophical theories. The chapter examines the relation between the inner and outer, the relation between sensation and its natural and linguistic expression. It explores private ownership that is the impossibility of different people having the same sensation. The paradigmatic application of the qualitative‐numerical distinction is the case of physical objects, objects with a spatiotemporal location.