Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-40 (1999)
Consider the following principle: (LP) If an action is undetermined at a time t, then its happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck, and so it could not be a free and responsible action. This principle (which we may call the luck principle, or simply LP) is false, as I shall explain shortly. Yet it seems true.
|Keywords||Chance Epistemology Free Will Indeterminism Luck|
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Citations of this work BETA
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Persistent Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise Defense.E. Schultz, E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.
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